Planned security upgrades to US nuclear facilities, which include equipping guards with armoured vehicles and large-calibre weapons are behind schedule, according to the New York Times.The latest design basis threat for US nuclear facilities envisages an attack on a facility by a “large and more capable group of attackers”. Utilising large groups of attackers poses significant problems for a terrorist group, not least because the chances of the mission being compromised by intelligence services are that much greater, but 9/11 is testament to Al-Qaeda’s determination to attempt this if it can be justified by the desired end result. And a nuclear release in a Western country would certainly fit Al-Qaeda’s strategy.
But it may not be necessary to attack such a facility if Al-Qaeda can get hold of the some of the allegedly 40kg of weapons-useable uranium which has been stolen from facilities worldwide over the past decade or so.
A report by the US-based Stanford Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources identified 700 illicit radioactive material trafficking incidents during the period 1991-2002. The report cites insiders as posing the greatest threat. Insiders, according to the report, “include civilian employees at facilities that house nuclear material or radiation sources, military personnel, and security guards.
For example, out of seven known thefts or attempted diversions of weapons-usable fissile material (Podolsk in 1992, Andreeva Guba in 1993, Sevmorput in 1993, Electrostal in 1994 and 1995, Sukhumi in 1992-1997, and the Chelyabinsk region in 1998), six were committed by insiders.” In one instance the Russian FSB foiled a plot to steal a quantity of materisl sufficient to build a viable nuclear device.
Contact David if you would like a copy of the SDNS report Nuclear Smuggling Chains: Suppliers, Intermediaries, and End-Users.
Contact David if you would like a copy of the SDNS report Nuclear Smuggling Chains: Suppliers, Intermediaries, and End-Users.
